Operation Thursday
Burma—The Forgotten War
1943

Following victories in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, Japanese forces drove northward through Burma in an attempt to sever Allied supply lines that were sustaining China in its war with Japan. In May 1942, Allied resistance collapsed, cutting off the Burma Road, the only overland supply route to China. The Allies continued to supply China by air, flying cargo planes over the Himalayas in northern Burma, just out of the range of Japanese fighters. Known as the “Burma Hump”, this vital but limited supply line kept China in the war. It soon became apparent, however, that the airlift alone could not sustain China over the long run.

At a conference in August 1943, the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed on a strategy to push the Japanese out of northern Burma and re-establish a ground-based supply line between India and China. An all-out offensive was planned for the fall of 1943.

The Chindits and the 1st Air Commando Group

The Burma offensive began in October 1943. The plan included an extensive guerrilla operation designed to disrupt Japanese communication and supply lines and to divert attention from the main Allied units in the north. The operation was to be carried out by the Chindits, a specially trained, mixed force of British, Ghurka, and Burmese guerrilla fighters led by Brigadier General Orde Charles Wingate, a commander with extensive unconventional warfare experience.

A special unit of the U.S. Army Air Forces was created to provide air support for the Chindits. Initially designated as the 5218th Air Unit, the highly secret outfit was placed under the command of Colonel Philip C. Cochran, a veteran fighter pilot with an unconventional approach that was well suited to the assignment. Cochran requisitioned an unusual assortment of more than 350 aircraft, including 100 CG-4A gliders, and assembled a hand picked force of 523 officers and men. Once established in eastern India, the unit was re-designated as the 1st Air Commando Group.

Glider Operations in Burma

The initial objective of the guerrilla campaign was to establish a system of strongholds in northern Burma to serve as forward bases for the Chindits. Three of the strongholds, codenamed “Picadilly”, “Broadway”, and “Chowringhee”, were to be established in isolated jungle clearings near the Burmese village of Indaw. In a mission codenamed “Operation Thursday”, the glider detachment of the 1st Air Commando Group was assigned to transport a Chindit brigade and a detachment of U.S. Army engineers into the three clearings on the first night of the campaign.

On the day of the planned glider landings, Colonel Cochran sent a B-25 to take reconnaissance pictures of the landing sites. The photos revealed that hundreds of teak logs were lying in rows across the clearing at Picadilly. General Wingate feared that the Japanese had intentionally placed the logs in the clearing as a deterrent, and were waiting in ambush at all three of the landing areas. His superiors disagreed. A decision was made to cancel the landing at Picadilly due to the obstructions, but to go forward with the landings at Broadway and Chowringhee.

The Broadway mission was the first to launch, and the trouble began almost immediately. Unknown to the glider pilots, many of the Chindits had taken along extra ammunition, adding weight to the already overloaded gliders. As the gliders hit turbulence in route, the extra weight caused many of the gliders to break away from their tow planes and crash land in the jungle. Of the gliders that managed to reach Broadway, the first few landed without incident. As more gliders came in, however, several hit deep ruts and teak logs, sheering off their landing gear, and causing them to flip over or tumble. The logs and ruts, left over from Burmese logging operations, were hidden from the reconnaissance flights by the tall grass in the clearings.

Those who survived the landings scrambled to reposition pathfinder lights to keep the incoming gliders away from hitting hidden obstructions or glider wreckage. It soon became apparent that losses would be too high if the landings continued, and a pre-arranged recall signal was broadcast from the landing area. Only 31 of the 68 gliders launched that night made it into Broadway, and of the ones that made it, virtually all of them were severely damaged on landing. Of the 539 men that landed, 31 were killed, and another 30 were seriously injured.

Initially, mission commanders in India interpreted the recall signal to mean that Broadway was under attack. Further communications revealed there was no enemy resistance at Broadway, and that the troops who had made it were working to clear a runway so that the mission could be resumed. By nightfall of the first day, U.S. Army engineers had cleared a dirt runway 5,000 feet long by 300 feet wide. Later that night, C-47s began ferrying troops and supplies into Broadway, establishing an effective base of operation. Within a few days, other strongholds were established, and the Chindits began their guerilla campaign against the Japanese.

Over the next six months, the glider detachment of the 1st Air Commando Group flew close to 100 missions in support of the guerrilla campaign. Most of the missions were flown at night into unfamiliar landing areas carved out of the jungle by the guerrillas. On a typical mission the glider pilot would carry in reinforcements, ammunition and supplies, which would be quickly unloaded and replaced with wounded guerrillas for the return trip. The glider would then be snatched off of the ground by the same C-47 that towed it in earlier that night. In cases where the glider was seriously damaged on landing, the glider pilot would become a foot soldier, fighting alongside the guerrillas until he could catch a ride back with the next re-supply mission.

Operation Husky
The Invasion of Sicily
July 9-16, 1943

Anticipating victory against Italian and German forces in North Africa, the American and British Combined Chiefs of Staff began preparations for the invasion of Europe. The Combined Chiefs selected Sicily as the initial entry point for the campaign. They believed that the loss of Sicily would cause Mussolini’s already shaky regime to collapse, and would ultimately lead to Italy’s withdrawal from the war.

Under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, British and American forces planned a two-pronged amphibious assault. The British Eighth Army, led by General Bernard L. Montgomery, would make the main attack on the east coast of Sicily just south of Syracuse. The Eighth Army was to take Syracuse, and then move quickly northward to take the northeastern point of the island to prevent Axis forces from escaping across the Straits of Messina to mainland Italy. The American Seventh Army, under General George S. Patton, would launch a supporting attack on the southern coast of Sicily. The Seventh Army was to drive across the island to the northwest and take Palermo, and then turn eastward to link up with the British Eighth Army at Messina.

The Airborne Plan

The airborne plan called for American and British forces to go in on the night before the amphibious assault to capture and hold the key bridges and roadways that would allow the Allied main force to break out of the beachheads. Originally, the airborne assault was to be an all parachute operation. Gliders were to be used only in then re-supply effort once the beachheads were established and airfields were secured.

After two months of planning for a parachute operation, the plans were presented to General Montgomery. Expressing concern about parachute troops being scattered during a night operation, Montgomery announced that he wanted the British airborne forces to be spearheaded by gliders so that the troops could land in tight clusters near their objectives. Planners objected to the startling proposal, saying that not enough British gliders were available for the mission, and that British glider pilots were not trained to land at night. Montgomery prevailed, however, and with a little more than six weeks left before the invasion, a massive effort was launched to train and equip British forces for a nighttime glider assault. The Americans, meanwhile, stayed with the original plan for an all-parachute operation.

The answer to the British equipment problem was the American built CG-4A glider. In mid March, invasion planners had requested shipment of 500 CG-4As to North Africa for use in the re-supply missions that would follow the Sicily landings. To carry out Montgomery’s plan, 346 of the CG-4As were transferred to the British forces for glider assaults. In addition to the CG-4As, 19 British Horsa gliders were available for the mission. American glider pilots were assigned to train the British on the flight characteristics of the CG-4A and provide instruction on night landings. Thirty of the American instructors volunteered to go along as co-pilots on the British operation as observers for the U.S. glider program.

Disaster over Sicily

The Allied airborne operations in Sicily were plagued by serious problems from the start. Mission planners had little or no experience dealing with the complexities of the new airborne concept. In an attempt to avoid the possibility of friendly fire incidents, they developed a flight plan that stretched the capabilities of inexperienced tow pilots and navigators. Flying at night, 200 feet above the water, the pilots ran into unexpected turbulence that scattered the formations, causing many pilots to miss the 90-degree turns at checkpoints along the way.

The result in both the American and British formations was chaos. Aircraft approached their assigned areas out of sequence and from all different directions. Many pilots took evasive action or changed altitudes to avoid collisions or to evade heavy flak from the shore batteries. Blowing dust obscured visual checkpoints, causing many pilots to miss their release and drop zones by miles. Parachute and glider troops were scattered over a wide area.

British gliders, which were to be released over the water, experienced unexpectedly strong headwinds preventing many of them from reaching shore—72 gliders ended up in the water. Of the 605 officers and men lost in the initial British glider operation, more than 300 were presumed to have drowned—19 of them were American glider pilots who had volunteered as observers.

An airborne reinforcement operation in the American beachhead on the second day of the invasion ended in tragedy when ground and naval gunners mistook a formation of C-47s full of American paratroops for enemy bombers. Overall, 318 paratroopers were killed and 23 aircraft were lost in this friendly fire incident. Tragedy struck again three days later when naval gunners fired on C-47s carrying British paratroopers, resulting in the loss of 11 aircraft.

In spite of all of the problems, the airborne component of Operation Husky was considered to be a qualified success. The few troops that made it to their assigned targets were able to take their objectives and hold them until they linked up with the main invasion forces. Scattered troops also contributed to the success of the invasion by fighting as independent units and causing confusion among the Axis forces.

Overall, airborne forces made a significant contribution to the success of the Sicily invasion. The price of victory, however, was too high, prompting many American military leaders to question the effectiveness of large-scale airborne operations. The questions ultimately led to major changes in glider and parachute tactics that would greatly enhance the capabilities of the airborne forces.

Operation Overlord
The Invasion of Occupied France
June 6-12, 1944

In March 1943, four months before the Allied invasion of Sicily, an office was established to begin planning for the Allied invasion of Normandy. It was apparent from the moment that France fell that a cross-channel invasion from England was inevitable. It was also clear that such an operation would be unprecedented in its scope and complexity.

By the time that General Eisenhower was appointed as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in December 1943, the invasion plans had already taken shape. It was to be a two-phased operation. Phase One called for a large-scale amphibious assault along a sixty mile stretch of the Normandy coastline, extending from Caen in the east to the base of the Cotentin Peninsula in the west. Once a beachhead was established and sufficient combat power was assembled, Phase Two would begin with a push to liberate Paris, followed by a massive drive northeastward toward Belgium, Holland and Germany.

The Airborne Plan

Operation Overlord relied heavily on airborne infantry to capture key roadways, bridges and communications centers in advance of the main invasion force landing on the beaches of Normandy. Taking control of these vital objectives would reduce the effectiveness of German counter attacks and provide Allied forces with a means of breaking out of the beachhead. Airborne forces were also used to neutralize German artillery batteries defending the invasion beaches.

The invasion was to begin just after midnight on D-Day with a British glider assault on the eastern flank of the beachhead. The airborne assault in the American sector was to begin at 1 am with a parachute assault into six drop-zones located six to ten miles inland from Utah beach. The paratroops were to be followed a few hours later by the first glider missions carrying reinforcements, heavy weapons, jeeps and support equipment. To avoid detection by German radar, the initial jump planes were to fly over the Cotentin peninsula, approaching the drop zones from the west.

On D-Day, the lead formations of airborne troop planes encountered a low cloudbank that limited visibility for the Troop Carrier pilots. As a result, airborne pathfinders, who were to parachute in ahead of the main force and mark the landing areas, were dropped off-target. When the main airborne force arrived, they ran into the same cloudbank that the pathfinders had encountered. With no pathfinder guidance and limited visibility, the pilots of the main force had difficulty locating their drop zones. Adding to the confusion, German anti-aircraft crews sent up a tremendous barrage of flak and anti-aircraft fire. The troop plane formations were scattered, dropping the paratroopers over a wide area.

U.S. Glider Operations in Normandy

The first two gliders missions arrived in Normandy at 4 am while it was still dark. Codenamed Chicago and Detroit, they followed the same route of flight as the earlier paratroop missions encountering the same hostile conditions upon arrival. In addition, they had to contend with trees and hedgerows that were much taller expected. This forced the gliders to come in high and land long causing many of them to crash into hedgerows on the other side of the field. The darkness also made it difficult for the pilots to avoid “Rommel’s Asparagus”, the massive poles erected in empty fields to discourage glider landings. While the gliders were scattered, and casualties were high, these missions managed to deliver heavy weapons and additional troops that were essential to the success of the invasion.

The next two missions, Keokuk and Elmira, were flown late in afternoon D-Day. Their purpose was to reinforce the 82nd Airborne’s position behind the beachhead. With element of surprise gone, these missions were to take the most direct path to the landing zone, flying directly over the Utah beach. As the time for the missions approached, it was clear to General Ridgeway, commander of the 82nd Airborne, that the landing zones were not fully under Allied control. However, having lost his radios in the initial drop, he was unable to warn the on-coming gliders. In spite of heavy casualties, the Keokuk and Detroit missions successfully delivered much needed reinforcements and ammunition to the 82nd Airborne.

The final two glider missions of Operation Overlord were flown in the early morning hours of the second day of the invasion. Codenamed Galveston and Hackensack, these missions carried a second wave of reinforcements to the 82nd Airborne. Word of continued German resistance had now reached invasion headquarters, prompting a change in the landing zones for these missions. However, small fields, tall trees, Rommel’s asparagus and debris from earlier glider landings combined to limit options for the incoming glider pilots. As with the earlier missions, casualties were high, but the majority of the troops and most of the equipment arrived in fighting condition.

U.S. and British airborne operations in Normandy on June 6th and 7th involved more than 850 gliders that delivered men and equipment that were essential to the success of Operation Overlord. While casualties were high, the losses were much lower than predicted by many of the Allied commanders. Overall, the survival rate of glider forces in the landing area was comparable to that of parachute forces, proving that the glider was an effective part of the airborne concept.

Operation Dragoon
The Invasion of Southern France
August 15, 1944

Operation Dragoon was originally planned as a diversionary attack that was to take place in advance of the invasion of Normandy. Anticipating that Allied forces would control most of Italy by the spring of 1944, the plan called for an amphibious and airborne attack to be launched on the southern coast of France using northern Italy as a base. Once Germany committed its forces in defense of southern France, the Allies would then launch the main attack, Operation Overlord, from the north.

As spring approached, it became apparent that a diversionary attack in southern France would be impossible. The ground war in Italy had bogged down, tying up the Allied forces that were to be used for the southern France operation. In April 1944, Allied Headquarters reluctantly cancelled Operation Dragoon, and made plans for launching Operation Overlord without a major diversionary attack.

In late June 1944, as operations in Italy were winding down, Operation Dragoon was suddenly revived. General Eisenhower wanted to open up a second front in France to take pressure of the invasion forces in Normandy, which had not yet broken out of the beachhead. The British, who were responsible for Allied combat operations in the Mediterranean, argued for a push northeastward from Italy into Yugoslavia, Austria and Hungary in an effort to keep that region from falling into communist hands after the war. Eisenhower prevailed, and D-Day for operation Dragoon was set for August 15th.

The Airborne Operations Plan

The airborne plan in southern France called for a three-phased operation. In Phase One, paratroopers were to be dropped a few miles inland from the invasion beaches just before dawn to keep German forces from counterattacking and to clear landing zones for the gliders. Phase Two was a glider assault that was to coincide with the main amphibious landings at 8 am. In Phase Three, a combined parachute and glider assault would be launched in the early evening hours of D-Day to reinforce the beachhead.

Glider Operations in Southern France

As the main amphibious forces were going ashore just after 8:00 am, the first glider mission of Operation Dragoon was arriving over the coast of France. Codenamed Bluebird, this mission was carrying the 64th Light Artillery Battery of the Royal Artillery into a landing zone just south of the village of Mitan. Bluebird was launched in two serials—one consisting of 35 Horsas piloted by British glider pilots, the other made up of 40 CG-4A Wacos piloted by American glider pilots. As the mission was passing over Corsica in route to France, General Paul Williams, commander of all troop carriers for Operation Dragoon, issued a recall of the Horsa serial. Reports of heavy fog in the landing zone prompted fears that the heavily loaded, all-wood Horsas would suffer unacceptable losses if they were allowed to land. The CG-4A Wacos, with their tougher steel frames, were allowed to continue. When the Wacos arrived over the landing zone, the ground was obscured by heavy fog, forcing the pilots to circle until conditions improved. After nearly an hour of orbiting, visibility improved and the CG-4As began cutting loose. Thanks to aggressive actions by British paratroopers on the ground, the landing zone had been cleared of German forces and most of the Rommels Asparagus had been removed. While there were some injuries, everyone in first glider landings of the day survived. The Horsa serial, which had returned to Italy, refueled and set off again for southern France. Arriving over the coast at 5:45 pm, the Horsas cut loose and made an uneventful landing near Mitan.

The second glider mission, codenamed Dove, departed Italy in mid-afternoon. The mission was organized into a large formation consisting of seven serials, precisely sequenced to ensure that the aircraft arrived over the landing area in an orderly fashion. Just past the island of Corsica, the lead glider in one of the serials informed his tow pilot that his tail section was vibrating badly and he was going to cut loose for an emergency landing. The tow pilot turned back toward Corsica to give the glider pilot a better chance of making it to shore, failing to realize that the entire serial was following him as he deviated from course. Once he realized his mistake, he turned back to rejoin the formation, but was now out of sequence. The jostling that occurred to accommodate the out-of-place serial caused confusion in the formation. As the gliders reached the landing zone near the village of Le Muy, several serials cut loose at one time, filling the sky with gliders. Most of the glider pilots managed to avoid each other as they spiraled downward, but several collisions occurred on the ground as glider pilots attempted to land in the crowded fields and vineyards. Eleven glider pilots were killed and thirty-two were seriously injured in crashes on the landing field.

In spite of the problems on the Dove mission, the glider missions overall were successful in delivering their men and equipment to the assigned landing areas, providing airborne forces with the firepower needed to protect the invasion beaches. By the end of the first day, all three combat divisions of the main force had landed, and were advancing inland ahead of schedule.

Operation Market Garden
Holland
September 17-25, 1944

After breaking out of the Normandy beachhead, Allied forces advanced rapidly, liberating Paris on August 25th and continuing to drive northeastward toward Germany. Over the next several weeks, the Allies followed Eisenhower’s strategy of attacking along a broad front, with resources being divided evenly between British Field Marshal Montgomery’s Twenty-First Army Group in the north and American General Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group in the south.

Montgomery, who had never fully agreed with Eisenhower’s strategy, proposed a new strategy that would combine the Twenty-First and Twelfth Army Groups into one single army for a push northward through Belgium and Holland in an effort to flank Germany’s defenses. Bradley favored a straight-forward approach, building on recent advances made by General George Patton’s tank forces that had pushed a full one hundred miles ahead of Montgomery’s troops.

Eisenhower crafted a compromise, keeping the American and British led Army groups separate, but providing Montgomery with the resources that he needed for his northward thrust. Montgomery immediately drove his forces northward into Belgium, liberating Brussels and Antwerp. As he continued to push northward toward Holland, Montgomery pressured Eisenhower for additional resources. Eisenhower offered Montgomery use of the First Allied Airborne Army, a newly formed organization consisting of all U.S. and British airborne and troop carrier forces in Europe. Four days after receiving the offer, Montgomery announced Operation Market-Garden, a combined airborne and ground campaign based on the flanking strategy that he had proposed earlier. Eisenhower approved the plan in early September. Montgomery set D-Day for the operation as September 17, 1944.

The Plan

The invasion would kick off with “Market”, a massive glider and parachute assault to capture five key bridges along a 55-mile stretch of roadway leading northward through Holland. The last bridge along the route, located in Arnhem, would give the Allies a means of crossing the Rhine River, a great natural boundary that separates the lowlands of Holland and Belgium from central Germany. Once the bridges were under Allied control, “Garden” would commence, involving a drive northward by Montgomery’s ground forces along the captured roadway. On crossing the Rhine River at Arnhem, Montgomery’s army would then turn southward, pushing deep into the heart of Germany.

A Bridge Too Far

In a staff briefing, Montgomery stressed that the entire operation depended on airborne forces holding on to all five bridges for the two days that it would take his ground forces to drive to the Rhine River crossing in Arnhem. British Lieutenant General Frederick Browning, Deputy Commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, advised Montgomery that the airborne could hold out for as much as four days, adding as an afterthought, “But I think, sir, we may be going a bridge too far.” His words were prophetic.

The plan called for the largest airborne operation ever attempted. The U.S. 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions, the 1st British Airborne Division and the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade were assigned to the mission. U.S. airborne forces were assigned to capture the bridges and roadways leading to the Rhine River crossing in Arnhem. The 1st British Airborne Division and the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade were assigned to capture and hold the Arnhem bridge. Due to a shortage of jump and tow planes, the airborne plan called for a phased deployment of airborne forces over a three-day period. The lead forces were to capture the primary objectives on the first day of the invasion, and were to be reinforced by massive glider and parachute missions on the second and third day.

On D-Day, successful drops were made in all three sectors, but stiff German resistance prevented airborne forces from achieving their initial objectives. Over the following days, badly needed glider reinforcements were delayed by heavy fog at departure airfields in England and over the English Channel. The delays slowed down the Allies, but didn’t prevent them from capturing the roadways and bridges that allowed ground forces to advance as far north as the outskirts of Arnhem. When they arrived, however, the Rhine River bridge was still in German hands. British and Polish airborne forces assigned to capture the bridge had encountered two German SS Panzer divisions that by chance had moved into the area a few weeks earlier to convalesce. These elite units joined in with German occupation forces to hold the Arnhem bridge, stopping the Allied ground advance south of the Rhine River.

Overall, the largest airborne operation of the war was a failure, having fallen one bridge short of its primary objective—the creation of pathway for Montgomery’s ground forces to flank Germany’s defenses and bring an early conclusion to the war. The efforts of the airborne forces, however, were not wasted. In the drive to Arnhem, U.S. airborne and British ground forces took control of southern Holland, liberating more than 1.5 million people. The glider forces made a significant contribution to this effort, completing 2262 out of 2598 missions, a success rate of approximately 87 percent.

Operation Varsity
The Crossing of the Rhine
March 24, 1945

After recovering from the setbacks of the fall and winter of 1944, the Allies returned to Eisenhower’s strategy of attacking on a broad front. His plan was to move forward deliberately until reaching the west bank of the Rhine River. With all of his forces in place, Eisenhower planned to launch a combination of amphibious and airborne assaults across the river. Once bridgeheads were established on the east side of the river, he would then push forward through the Ruhr, neutralizing Germany’s industrial capacity.

The Rhine offensive kicked off on February 23, 1945. General George Patton’s Third Army reached the west bank of the river on March 7. As expected, the Germans had already destroyed the bridges, bringing Patton’s drive to a temporary halt. However, thirty-five miles north of Patton, the First Army surprised German forces, capturing the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen. Constant shelling by German artillery finally caused the bridge to collapse, but not before the Americans had established an extensive bridgehead on the east side of the river.

Moving quickly to take advantage of the situation, Eisenhower ordered a series of concentrated assaults to establish river crossings along the entire front. In the north, forces under the command of British Field Marshal Montgomery made preparations to execute a combined amphibious and airborne assault near the town of Wesel, Germany. The ground component of the plan was codenamed Operation Plunder. The airborne plan was called Operation Varsity.

The Airborne Plan

American General Lewis Brereton, commander of the 1st Allied Airborne Army, was responsible for planning the airborne assault. Concerned about repeating the mistakes of the Market Garden campaign, General Brereton established four conditions for the deployment of his troops. First, all airborne forces had to be delivered on the same day in a single, sustained lift. This would reduce the chances of a change in weather affecting the delivery of reinforcements into the airhead. Second, Brereton issued a directive that all parachute and glider forces be dropped directly on top of their objectives, seeking to avoid the fate of the British airborne forces at the Arnhem bridge who were cut off from the their reinforcements. Third, he demanded that all known flak positions be eliminated by extensive air strikes just prior to the drop. And finally, he insisted that all gliders have two qualified pilots at the controls.

General Brereton’s conditions were incorporated into a plan that called for airborne forces to drop behind enemy lines on the morning after a nighttime amphibious assault across the Rhine River. Parachute and glider forces would be dropped east of the river behind the Diersfordter Forest, a section of high ground overlooking the crossing point for the main assault. Their primary mission was to neutralize German artillery and infantry positions in the area, and to capture the key bridges and crossroads that would allow the Allies to maneuver once established on the east side of the river. The airborne forces for Operation Varsity would include the British 6th the American 17th Airborne divisions, making it largest single-day airborne mission of the war.

Gliders Crossing the Rhine

On D-Day, the greatest challenge for the troop carrier and glider pilots was poor visibility. Just prior to the invasion, the Allied air forces bombarded the town of Wesel, kicking up a huge cloud of smoke and dust. Further reducing visibility was a dense smoke screen ordered by Field Marshal Montgomery to provide cover for the amphibious crossing. With little or no visual reference to the ground, many of the troop carriers missed their drop zones, causing the paratroops to be scattered throughout the area.

As the glider forces arrived over the area, they encountered the same visibility problems as the paratroops. Glider pilots cut loose and descended through the thick clouds of smoke and dust, straining to spot their designated landing zones. Many had to pick out a landing site in the last few seconds of their flight. As a result, many of the gliders landed outside of their landing zones, encountering heavy fire from German forces that were positioned throughout the area. While casualties were heavy, the glider and parachute forces were able to assemble quickly due to the close proximity of the landing and drop zones.

By late afternoon on D-Day, the 1st Allied Airborne Army had taken most of its objectives, and had neutralized German artillery overlooking Montgomery’s crossing point on the Rhine River. Over the next two days, Montgomery’s forces established a system of bridges and ferries that transported 20 combat divisions and more than 1,500 tanks to the east side of the river. With all of his forces in place, Montgomery gave the order to move forward on March 26, pushing quickly to the east and southeast in an effort to cut off the Ruhr from the rest of Germany. General Patton’s forces, which had crossed the Rhine one day prior to Operation Varsity, drove northward to link up with Montgomery, completing the encirclement of the Ruhr on March 31.